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Write a 300-500 word substantive journal entry explaining how the operational variables affect strategic estimates over time and why as a future SGM/CSM it’s important to understand these operational variables.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tc7_102.pdf 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18010_ADP%203-0%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf

For any military activity to succeed, military officials, should be aware of different variable which influences the activity procedure and condition. These factors are those components inside an operational domain, either military or non-military, which vacillate starting with one operational zone then onto the next and influence the activity. The Sergeant major (SGM), who is the military position, staff opening, and the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) who is the senior counselor of the leader, should know about different factors to accomplish the ideal end. They should have the option to note vulnerabilities and use them to foresee their.
In this manner in the dynamic procedure, they need to decide, concoct plans, and furthermore direct activities under the conveying degrees of vulnerability. During arranging, the group must authorities must casing an operational domain, which will draw out the ideal end state. The arranging group recovers this condition in visual models appearing and depicting the operational factors. These factors involve political, monetary, social, Information, physical condition, military, and time. Connections and the future objectives of applicable entertainers for both the present state and the future operational situations. In this manner, these factors are very basic for any future SGM/CSM. The military variable in getting different reasonable angles and even guide in picking the right operational workmanship. This workmanship can be characterized as the methodology by which the authorities create in utilizing the military powers in any activity. These physical situations help more in comprehension, picturing, and depiction of the landscape and subsequently the vital craftsmanship to sue. Time encourages ready to acquire the necessary conditions which, when set up, produce the ideal end. It additionally helps in mapping out how the sent powers would accomplish the ideal result and the activities that they have to ttain the conditions. Once more, these factors help in concocting significant assets and different alleviation measures to handle the dangers to be experienced. They additionally help in understanding the present condition of the operational condition. Time is essential as it decides how commandants use powers and capacities to accomplish the ultimate objective.

Chapter II
JP 5-0
CSAs, and applicable DOD agencies for preparation of plans based on current military capabilities. It implements the planning guidance provided in the GEF and the joint planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance. In addition to communicating to the CCMDs’ specific planning guidance necessary for planning, the JSCP operationalizes the strategic vision described in the NMS and nests with the strategic direction delineated by the NSS, DSR, and the DOD’s planning and resourcing guidance provided in the GEF. The JSCP also provides integrated planning guidance and direction for planners.
The JSCP is described in detail in CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
e. GFMIG. The GFMIG documents force planning and execution guidance and show assignment of forces in support of the UCP. GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the DSR and GEF, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of US military resources and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. JS prepares the document for SecDef approval, with the Joint Staff J-8 [Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment] overseeing the assignment and apportionment of forces and the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] overseeing the allocation of forces. It is updated every two years and approved by SecDef. The GFMIG informs planners of the processes for distributing forces globally. It provides SecDef direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for assigning forces to CCDRs in order to accomplish their assigned missions, specifies the allocation process that provides access to forces and capabilities when assigned mission requirements exceed the capacity and/or capability of the assigned and currently allocated forces, includes apportionment guidance to facilitate planning, and informs the joint force structure and capability assessment processes. The assignment tables in the GFMIG and Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum serve as the record of force assignments. SecDef’s decision to allocate forces is ordered in the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).
See Appendix E, “Global Force Management,” for additional information and descriptions.
9. Combatant Commanders
a. Planning Organization. At the CCMD level, a joint planning group (JPG), operational planning group, or operational planning team (OPT) is typically established to direct planning efforts across the command, including implementation of plans and orders.
b. Strategic Estimate. The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate commands and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and trends, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objectives over the timeframe of the strategy.
J400 Reading A 2
Strategic Guidance and Coordination
(1) The strategic estimate is a tool available to commanders as they develop plans. CCDRs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s OE, and is the basis for the development of the GCC’s theater strategy.
(2) The CCDR, the CCDR’s staff, and supporting commands and agencies evaluate the broad strategic-level factors that influence the theater strategy.
(3) The estimate should include an analysis of strategic direction received from the President, SecDef, or the authoritative body of a MNF; an analysis of all states, groups, or organizations in the OE that may threaten or challenge the CCMD’s ability to advance and defend US interests in the region; visualization of the relevant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural factors in the region; an evaluation of major strategic and operational challenges facing the CCMD; an analysis of known or anticipated opportunities the CCMD can leverage; and an assessment of risks inherent in the OE.
(4) The result of the strategic estimate is a visualization and better understanding of the OE to include allies, partners, neutrals, enemy combatants, and adversaries. The strategic estimate process is continuous and provides input used to develop strategies and implement plans. The broad strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting the commander’s estimate of the situation for a specific operation.
(5) Supported and supporting CCDRs and subordinate commanders all prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.
See Appendix B, “Strategic Estimate,” for a notional strategic estimate format.
c. CCMD Strategies. A strategy is a broad statement of the commander’s long-term vision. It is the bridge between national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and command objectives and attain end states. Specifically, it links CCMD activities, operations, and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. A strategy should describe the ends as directed in strategic guidance and the ways and means to attain them. A strategy should begin with the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format for a strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources. CCDRs employ strategies to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies, and support and advance US interests. To support this, strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, force posture, and preparation for contingencies. Strategies typically employ military engagement, close cooperation with DOS, embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy should be informed by the means or resources available to support the attainment of designated end states and may include military resources, programs, policies, and available funding. CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination
J400 Reading A 3
B-1
APPENDIX B STRATEGIC ESTIMATE
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION
1. Background
a. The strategic estimate is an analytical tool available to CCDRs before developing theater or functional strategies; theater, functional or DOD-wide campaign plans, subordinate campaign plans; and OPLANs. Strategic estimates provide the commander’s perspective of the strategic and operational levels of the OE, threats and opportunities that could facilitate or hinder the achievement of GEF-directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of how those objectives might be achieved. Developed annually and regularly updated, the strategic estimate is the basis for developing the CCDR’s theater or functional strategy.
b. The CCDR, the CCMD staff, supporting commands, and agencies assess the broad strategic factors that influence OE, thus informing the ends, ways, means, and risks involved in accomplishing the prescribed campaign objectives.
c. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple commands may prepare strategic estimates for each supporting operation.
d. Section B, “Notional Strategic Estimate Format,” presents a format a CCMD staff can use as a guide when developing a strategic estimate. The J-5 may provide the lead staff organization for the conduct of the strategic estimate with significant participation from the other staff directorates. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors.
e. The result of the strategic estimate is a better understanding and visualization of the complete OE to include adversaries, friends, and neutrals. The strategic estimate process is dynamic and continuous, and provides input for developing theater strategies and campaign plans. This strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting more detailed staff estimates as well as the commander’s estimate of the situation for a potential contingency.
f. The CCDRs strategic estimate should identify potential for spillover, both from the AOR or functional area perspective into other CCDRs’ AORs or functional areas and into the CCDR’s AOR or functional area based on operations and activities outside the AOR.
SECTION B. NOTIONAL STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FORMAT
2. Strategic Direction
(This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the theater or global situation and identifies strategic requirements in global and regional dimensions.)
J400 Reading A 4
Appendix B
B-2 JP 5-0
a. US Policy Goals. (Identify the US national security or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.)
b. Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the multinational [alliance or coalition] security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to, or coordinated by the CCMD.)
c. Opposition Policy Goals and Desired End State
d. End State(s). (Describe the campaign or operation objective[s] or end state[s] and related military objectives to achieve and end states to attain and maintain.)
3. Operational Environment
a. AOR. (Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic, political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the AOR assigned to the CCDR.)
b. Area of Interest. (Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the area of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)
c. Adversary Forces. (Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be hostile to, or that may threaten, US and partner nation interests, and appraise their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of the magnitude of the potential threat.)
d. Friendly Forces. (Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations. These include assigned US forces, regional allies, and anticipated multinational partners. Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of power [diplomatic, economic, and informational], US military supporting commands, and other agencies that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in this AOR.)
e. Neutral Forces. (Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the AOR and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they may impact US and friendly multinational operations.)
4. Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational Challenges
a. This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the AOR with which the CCDR may be tasked to deal.
b. These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation, peace operations, and security cooperation (including building partner capacity and capability), to providing response to atrocities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stability activities.
J400 Reading A 5
Strategic Estimate
B-3
5. Potential Opportunities
a. This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances, as well as emerging situations, that the CCMD may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic situation and further US or partner nation interests.
b. Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing strategic guidance and operational limitations.
6. Assessment of Risks
Risk is the probability and consequence of loss linked to hazards.
a. This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities in the OE.
b. Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and categorized according to significance or likelihood (most dangerous or most likely).
c. The CCMD staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks.
For more information on risk assessment, refer to CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.
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F-1
APPENDIX F FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS
FDOs and FROs are executed on order and provide scalable options to respond to a crisis. Commanders include FDOs and FROs as part of their plans to provide adaptive military options for SecDef or the President to deter or respond to a crisis. Both provide the ability to scale up (escalate) or de-escalate based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions and reaction. While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent the crisis from worsening and allow for de-escalation, FROs are generally punitive in nature.
SECTION A. FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS
1. General
a. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to signal to and influence an adversary’s actions. They are established to deter actions before or during a crisis. If necessary, FDOs may be used to prepare for future operations, recognizing they may well create a deterrent effect.
b. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power―diplomatic, informational, military, and economic―but they are most effective when combined across the instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.
c. FDOs provide options for decision makers during emerging crises to allow for gradual increase in pressure to avoid unintentionally provoking full-scale combat and to enable them to develop the situation and gain a better understanding of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions. FDOs are elements of contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to but outside the scope of the ongoing operations.
d. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figures F-1 through F-4. Key objectives of FDOs are:
(1) Communicate the strength of US commitments to treaty obligations and regional peace and stability.
(2) Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.
(3) Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.
(4) Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR without precipitating armed response from the adversary.
(5) Develop the situation without provoking the adversary to better understand his capabilities and intentions.