T he Right Thing
to Do
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T he Right Thing
to Do
Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy
SEVENTH EDITION
Edited by
Stuart Rachels
and
James Rachels
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THE RIGHT THING TO DO, SEVENTH EDITION
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The right thing to do: basic readings in moral philosophy/edited
by Stuart Rachels and James Rachels.—7th ed.
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ISBN 978-0-07-811908-8 (alk. paper)
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www.mhhe.com
v
Preface viii
About the Authors ix
INTRODUCTION
1. A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy James Rachels 1
2. Some Basic Points about Arguments James Rachels 19
UTILITARIANISM
3. Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 29
4. Utilitarianism and Integrity Bernard Williams 40
5. The Experience Machine Robert Nozick 45
OTHER THEORETICAL ESSAYS
6 . The Subjectivity of Values J. L. Mackie 48
7. Our Sense of Right and Wrong C. S. Lewis 60
8. The Categorical Imperative Immanuel Kant 65
9. The Virtues Aristotle 69
10. Master Morality and Slave Morality Friedrich Nietzsche 76
11. Caring Relations and Principles of Justice Virginia Held 80
ABORTION
12. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion
and Postscript on Infanticide Mary Anne Warren 87
13. Why Abortion Is Immoral Don Marquis 99
14. A Defense of Abortion Judith Jarvis Thomson 106
ANIMALS
15. All Animals Are Equal Peter Singer 123
16. Torturing Puppies and Eating Meat: It’s All in
Good Taste Alastair Norcross 133
17. Do Animals Have Rights? Tibor R. Machan 141
Contents
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vi CONTENTS
POVERTY
18. Famine, Affluence, and Morality Peter Singer 154
19. Poverty and Parenthood Stuart Rachels 164
THE DEATH PENALTY
20. A Defense of the Death Penalty Louis P. Pojman 182
21 . Why the United States Will Join the Rest of the World in
Abandoning Capital Punishment Stephen B. Bright 191
WAR, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE
22. Hellhole Atul Gawande 203
23. The Ethics of War and Peace Douglas P. Lackey 221
24. Fifty Years after Hiroshima John Rawls 230
25 . What Is Wrong with Terrorism? Thomas Nagel 238
26. Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb David
Luban 241
SEX AND DRUGS
27. America’s Unjust Drug War Michael Huemer 255
28 . Our Sexual Ethics Bertrand Russell 269
29. A Few Words about Gay Marriage Andrew Sullivan 276
30. Same-Sex Marriage and the Argument from Public
Disagreement David Boonin 278
31. Alcohol and Rape Nicholas Dixon 289
RACE, WOMEN, AND IMMIGRATION
32. Letter from the Birmingham City Jail Martin Luther
King Jr. 301
33. Is Racial Discrimination Arbitrary? Peter Singer 309
34 . In Defense of Quotas James Rachels 321
35. Homeward Bound Linda Hirshman 336
36. The Case for Open Immigration Michael Huemer 345
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BIOETHICS
37. The Morality of Euthanasia James Rachels 348
38. The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia J. Gay-Williams 353
39. The New Eugenics Matt Ridley 358
40 . Human Cloning and the Challenge of Regulation
John A. Robertson 365
41. Selling Organs for Transplantation Lewis Burrows 372
42. A Free Market Would Reduce Donations and Would Commodify
the Human Body James F. Childress 378
CONTENTS vii
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viii
Moral philosophy is the study of how one should live. This anthology
is an introduction to that great subject. The readings cover the main
moral theories and present a wealth of ideas about various practical
matters.
This book is a companion to The Elements of Moral Philosophy, which
was also written by James Rachels and revised by Stuart Rachels. These
two books complement each other and may be read together. However,
nothing in either book presupposes knowledge of the other.
In selecting the pieces for this volume, I was looking for articles
on serious moral topics that are deftly argued; that are pleasant to read;
that lend themselves to lively discussion; and that the average college
student can grasp. I believe that the selections chosen are not merely
good articles on suitable topics; they are first-rate essays on compelling
issues. Students who read this book will want to read more, unless the
subject is simply not for them.
This edition contains five new essays, replacing two that were elim-
inated. Thus, there is now more to choose from. As a counterpoise to
Mackie, I’ve added an essay by C.S. Lewis on the objectivity of morals.
Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” has now replaced “The
Singer Solution to World Poverty.” I’ve paired Singer’s piece with an
essay in which I argue that we should not have children, according to
Singer’s argument. In the section of the book called “Race, Women, and
Immigration,” I’ve added articles by Linda Hirshman, on equality in the
home, and Michael Huemer, who argues that U.S. immigration policy is
unjust because it imposes serious harms on non-citizens. The only essay
I have simply eliminated is John McMurtry’s “Monogamy: A Critique.”
I thank Heather Elliott, Daniel Hollingshead, Tucker Meyers, and
Carol Rachels for their help in preparing this edition.
To learn more about James Rachels, visit www.jamesrachels.org .
If you have suggestions for the next edition, please let me know:
[email protected]
—Stuart Rachels
Preface
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www.jamesrachels.org
[email protected]
ix
James Rachels (1941–2003) wrote The End of Life: Euthanasia
and Morality (1986), Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of
Darwinism (1990), Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in
Moral Philosophy (1997), Problems from Philosophy (first edition, 2005),
and The Legacy of Socrates: Essays in Moral Philosophy (2007). His
website is www.jamesrachels.org .
Stuart Rachels is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Alabama. He has revised several of James Rachels’
books, including The Elements of Moral Philosophy (eighth edition,
2015), and Problems from Philosophy . Stuart won the United States
Chess Championship in 1989, at the age of 20, and is a Bronze Life
Master at bridge. He is currently writing a book about his chess
career called The Best I Saw in Chess .
About the Authors
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www.jamesrachels.org
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1
CHAPTER 1
A Short Introduction to
Moral Philosophy
James Rachels
An ancient legend tells the story of Gyges, a poor shepherd who
found a magic ring in a fissure opened by an earthquake. The ring
would make its wearer invisible, so he could go anywhere and do any-
thing undetected. Gyges was an unscrupulous fellow, and he quickly
realized that the ring could be put to good advantage. We are told
that he used its power to gain entry to the royal palace where he
seduced the queen, murdered the king, and seized the throne. (It is
not explained how invisibility helped him to seduce the queen—but
let that pass.) In no time at all, he went from being a poor shepherd
to being king of all the land.
This story is recounted in Book II of Plato’s Republic. Like all of
Plato’s works, The Republic is written in the form of a dialogue between
Socrates and his companions. Glaucon, who is having an argument
with Socrates, uses the story of Gyges’s ring to make a point.
Glaucon asks us to imagine that there are two such rings, one
given to a man of virtue and the other given to a rogue. How might we
expect them to behave? The rogue, of course, will do anything neces-
sary to increase his own wealth and power. Since the cloak of invisibility
will protect him from discovery, he can do anything he pleases without
fear of being caught. Therefore, he will recognize no moral constraints
on his conduct, and there will be no end to the mischief he will do.
But how will the so-called virtuous man behave? Glaucon sug-
gests that he will do no better than the rogue:
No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength
of mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other
men’s goods, when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly
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2 T HE RIGHT THING TO DO
help himself to anything he wanted, enter houses and sleep with
any woman he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his plea-
sure, and in a word go about among men with the powers of a
god. He would behave no better than the other; both would take
the same course.
Moreover, Glaucon asks, why shouldn’t he? Once he is freed from
the fear of reprisal, why shouldn’t a person simply do what he
pleases, or what he thinks is best for himself? Why should he care
at all about “morality”?
The Republic, written over 2300 years ago, was one of the first
great works of moral philosophy in Western history. Since then, phi-
losophers have formulated theories to explain what morality is, why
it is important, and why it has the peculiar hold on us that it does.
What, if anything, justifies our belief that we morally ought to act in
one way rather than another?
Relativism
Perhaps the oldest philosophical theory about morality is that right and
wrong are relative to the customs of one’s society—on this view, there
is nothing behind the demands of morality except social convention.
Herodotus, the first of the great Greek historians, lived at about the
time of Socrates. His History is full of wonderful anecdotes that illustrate
his belief that “right” and “wrong” are little more than names for social
conventions. Of the Massagetae, a tribe in Central Asia, he writes:
The following are some of their customs—Each man has but one
wife, yet all the wives are held in common. . . . Human life does
not come to its natural close with these people; but when a man
grows very old, all his kinsfolk collect together and offer him up
in sacrifi ce; offering at the same time some cattle also. After the
sacrifi ce they boil the fl esh and feast on it; and those who thus
end their days are reckoned the happiest. If a man dies of disease
they do not eat him, but bury him in the ground, bewailing his ill-
fortune that he did not come to be sacrifi ced. They sow no grain,
but live on their herds, and on fi sh, of which there is great plenty
in the Araxes. Milk is what they chiefl y drink. The only god they
worship is the sun, and to him they offer the horse in sacrifi ce,
under the notion of giving the swiftest of the gods the swiftest of
all mortal creatures.
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A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3
Herodotus did not think the Massagetae were to be criticized for
such practices. Their customs were neither better nor worse than
those of other peoples; they were merely different. The Greeks,
who considered themselves more “civilized,” might have thought
that their customs were superior, but, Herodotus says, that is only
because everyone believes the customs of his own society to be the
best. The “truth” depends on one’s point of view—that is, on the
society in which one happens to have been raised.
Relativists think that Herodotus was obviously on to something
and that those who believe in “objective” right and wrong are merely
naïve. Critics, however, object to the theory on a number of grounds.
First, it is exceedingly conservative, in that the theory endorses what-
ever moral views happen to be current in a society. Consider our own
society. Many people believe that our society’s moral code is mistaken,
at least on some points—for example, they may disagree with the
dominant social view regarding capital punishment or homosexuality
or the treatment of nonhuman animals. Must we conclude that these
would-be reformers are wrong, merely because they oppose the major-
ity view? Why must the majority always be right?
But there is a deeper problem with Relativism, emphasized by
Socrates. Some social customs are, indeed, merely arbitrary, and when
these customs are at issue it is fruitless to insist that one society’s
practices are better than another’s. Funerary practices are a good
example. The Greeks burned their dead, while the Callatians ate their
dead, but neither practice is better than the other. However, it does
not follow from this that all social practices are arbitrary in the same
way. Some are, and some are not. The Greeks and the Callatians
were free to accept whatever funerary practices they liked because
no objective reason could be given why one practice was superior to
the other. In the case of other practices, however, there may be good
reasons why some are superior. It is not hard, for example, to explain
why honesty and respect for human life are socially desirable, and
similarly it is not hard to explain why slavery and racism are unde-
sirable. Because we can support our judgments about these matters
with rational arguments, we do not have to regard those judgments as
“merely” the expression of our particular society’s moral code.
Divine Commands
A second ancient idea, also familiar to Socrates, was that moral living
consists in obedience to divine commands. If this were true, then we
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4 T HE RIGHT THING TO DO
could easily answer the challenge of Gyges’s ring—even if we had the
power of invisibility, we would still be subject to divine retribution, so
ultimately we could not “get away with” doing whatever we wanted.
But Socrates did not believe that right living could consist
merely in trying to please the gods. In the Euthyphro, another of
Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is shown considering at some length
whether “right” can be the same as “what the gods command.” Now
we may notice, to begin with, that there are considerable practical
difficulties with this as a general theory of ethics. How, for example,
are we supposed to know what the gods command? There are those
who claim to have spoken with God about the matter and who there-
fore claim to be in a position to pass on his instructions to the rest
of us. But people who claim to speak for God are not the most
trustworthy folks—hearing voices can be a sign of schizophrenia or
megalomania just as easily as an instance of divine communication.
Others, more modestly, rely on scripture or church tradition for
guidance. But those sources are notoriously ambiguous—they give
vague and often contradictory instructions—so, when people consult
these authorities, they typically rely on whatever elements of scrip-
ture or church tradition support the moral views they are already
inclined to agree with. Moreover, because scripture and church tra-
dition have been handed down from earlier times, they provide little
direct help in addressing distinctively contemporary problems: the
problem of environmental preservation, for example, or the prob-
lem of how much of our resources should be allocated to cancer
research as opposed to other worthy endeavors.
Still, it may be thought that God’s commands provide the ulti-
mate authority for ethics, and that is the issue Socrates addressed.
Socrates accepted that the gods exist and that they may issue
instructions. But he showed that this cannot be the ultimate basis
of ethics. He pointed out that we have to distinguish two possibili-
ties: Either the gods have some reason for the instructions they
issue, or they do not. If they do not, then their commands are
merely arbitrary—the gods are like petty tyrants who demand that
we act in this way and that, even though there is no good reason
for it. But this is an impious view that religious people will not want
to accept. On the other hand, if we say that the gods do have good
reasons for their instructions, then we have admitted that there is
a standard of rightness independent of their commands—namely,
the standard to which the gods themselves refer in deciding what
to require of us.
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A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 5
It follows, then, that even if one accepts a religious picture of
the world, the rightness or wrongness of actions cannot be under-
stood merely in terms of their conformity to divine prescriptions.
We may always ask why the gods command what they do, and the
answer to that question will reveal why right actions are right and
why wrong actions are wrong.
Aristotle
Although Relativism and the Divine Command Theory have always
had supporters, they have never been popular among serious stu-
dents of moral philosophy. The first extended, systematic treatise
on moral philosophy, produced two generations after Socrates, was
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (ca. 330 bc ), and Aristotle wasted no
time on such notions. Instead, Aristotle offered a detailed account of
the virtues—the qualities of character that people need to do well in
life. The virtues include courage, prudence, generosity, honesty, and
many more; Aristotle sought to explain what each one is and why
it is important. His answer to the question of Gyges’s ring was that
virtue is necessary for human beings to achieve happiness; therefore,
the man of virtue is ultimately better off because he is virtuous.
Aristotle’s view of the virtuous life was connected with his over-
all way of understanding the world and our place in it. Aristotle’s
conception of what the world is like was enormously influential; it
dominated Western thinking for over 1700 years. A central feature
of this conception was that everything in nature exists for a purpose.
“Nature,” Aristotle said, “belongs to the class of causes which act for
the sake of something.”
It seems obvious that artifacts such as knives and chariots have
purposes, because we have their purposes in mind when we make
them. But what about natural objects that we do not make? Do they
have purposes too? Aristotle thought so. One of his examples was
that we have teeth so that we can chew. Such biological examples
are quite persuasive; the parts of our bodies do seem, intuitively,
to have particular purposes—eyes are for seeing, the heart is for
pumping blood, and so on. But Aristotle’s thesis was not limited to
organic beings. According to him, everything in nature has a purpose.
He also thought, to take a different sort of example, that rain falls
so that plants can grow. As odd as it may seem to a modern reader,
Aristotle was perfectly serious about this. He considered other alter-
natives, such as that the rain falls “of necessity” and that this helps
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6 T HE RIGHT THING TO DO
the plants only “by coincidence,” and rejected them. His considered
view was that plants and animals are what they are, and that the rain
falls as it does, “because it is better so.”
The world, therefore, is an orderly, rational system, with each
thing having its own proper place and serving its own special pur-
pose. There is a neat hierarchy: The rain exists for the sake of the
plants, the plants exist for the sake of the animals, and the animals
exist—of course—for the sake of people. Aristotle says: “If then we
are right in believing that nature makes nothing without some end
in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made all
things specifically for the sake of man.” This worldview is stunningly
anthropocentric, or human-centered. But Aristotle was hardly alone
in having such thoughts; almost every important thinker in human
history has advanced such a thesis. Humans are a remarkably vain
species.
Natural Law
The Christian thinkers who came later found Aristotle’s view of
the world appealing. There was only one thing missing: God. Thus,
the Christian thinkers said that the rain falls to help the plants
because that is what the Creator intended, and the animals are for
human use because that is what God made them for. Values and pur-
poses were, therefore, conceived to be a fundamental part of the
nature of things, because the world was believed to have been cre-
ated according to a divine plan.
This view of the world had a number of consequences for eth-
ics. On the most general level, it affirmed the supreme value of
human life, and it explained why humans are entitled to do whatever
they please with the rest of nature. The basic moral arrangement—
human beings, whose lives are sacred, dominating a world made for
their benefit—was enshrined as the Natural Order of Things.
At a more detailed level, a corollary of this outlook was that the
“laws of nature” specify how things ought to be, as well as describing
how things are. In turn, knowing how things ought to be enables us
to evaluate states of affairs as objectively good or bad. Things are as
they ought to be when they are serving their natural purposes; when
they do not or cannot serve those purposes, things have gone wrong.
Thus, teeth that have decayed and cannot be used for chewing are
defective; and drought, which deprives plants of the rain they need,
is a natural, objective evil.
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A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 7
There are also implications for human action: On this view,
moral rules are one type of law of nature. The key idea here is that
some forms of human behavior are “natural” while others are not;
and “unnatural” acts are said to be wrong. Beneficence, for example,
is natural for us because God has made us as social creatures. We
want and need the friendship of other people, and we have natu-
ral affections for them; hence, behaving brutishly toward them is
unnatural. Or to take a different sort of example, the purpose of
the sex organs is procreation. Thus, any use of them for other pur-
poses is “contrary to nature”—which is why the Christian church has
traditionally regarded any form of sexual activity that cannot result
in pregnancy, such as masturbation, gay sex, or sex with contracep-
tives, as impermissible.
This combination of ideas, together with others like them,
formed the core of an outlook known as natural-law ethics. The
Theory of Natural Law was developed most fully by Saint Thomas
Aquinas (1225–1274), who lived at a time when the Aristotelian
worldview was unchallenged. Aquinas was the foremost thinker
among traditional Catholic theologians. Today natural-law theory
still has adherents inside the Catholic Church, but few outside. The
reason is that the Aristotelian worldview, on which natural-law eth-
ics depends, has been replaced by the outlook of modern science.
Galileo, Newton, Darwin, and others developed ways of under-
standing natural phenomena that made no use of evaluative notions.
In their way of thinking, the rain has no purpose. It does not fall
in order to help the plants grow. Plants typically get the amount of
water they need because each species has evolved, by natural selec-
tion, in the environment in which that amount of water is available.
Natural selection produces an orderly arrangement that appears to
have been designed, but that is only an illusion. To explain nature
there is no need to assume purpose-involving principles, as Aristotle
and the Christians had done. This new outlook was threatening to
the Catholic Church, and they condemned it.
Modern science transformed people’s view of what the world is
like. But part of the transformation, inseparable from the rest, was
an altered view of the nature of ethics. Right and wrong could no
longer be deduced from the nature of things, for on the new view
the natural world does not, in and of itself, manifest value and pur-
pose. The inhabitants of the world may have needs and desires that
generate values special to them, but that is all. The world apart from
those inhabitants knows and cares nothing for their values, and it
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8 T HE RIGHT THING TO DO
has no values of its own. A hundred and fifty years before Nietzsche
declared, “There are no moral facts,” the Scottish philosopher David
Hume had come to the same conclusion. Hume summed up the
moral implications of the new worldview in his Treatise of Human
Nature (1739) when he wrote:
Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Willful murder, for in-
stance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can fi nd that matter
of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In whichever way
you take it, you fi nd only certain passions, motives, volitions and
thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case.
To Aristotle’s idea that “nature has made all things for the sake of
man,” Hume replied: “The life of a man is of no greater importance
to the universe than that of an oyster.”
The Social Contract
If morality cannot be based on God’s commands, nor on the idea of
natural purpose, then what can it be based on? Ethics must somehow
be understood as a purely human phenomenon—as the product of
…